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THE EUROPEAN UNION CONVENTION ON
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN
OVERVIEW AND COMMENT, WITH U.S.
INTEREST IN MINDt
Ian F. Fletcher*
I. INTRODUCTION: LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR THE
CONVENTION
For those already well familiar with the principal charac-
teristics of a cross-border insolvency and the typical problems
confronting the insolvency practitioner, the European Union
(formerly known as the European Community)' introduces a
further range of issues and complexities. There are numerous
ways in which the fundamental principles of the Union, which
are based upon the concept of a unified internal market, may
be transgressed during the course of an international insol-
vency. Typical problems include the incompatibility of different
national systems of insolvency law; legal and procedural obsta-
cles to recognition of the office-holder's standing to represent
the collectivised interests in the insolvent estate, and to assert
claims to the debtor's foreign assets; and the numerous possi-
bilities for exploitative behaviour by creditors and debtors
alike. Into this latter category fall such practices as the ring-
fencing of assets for the exclusive advantage of a restricted
sub-group of creditors linked to a specific country; the
utilisation of so-called "bankruptcy havens" for the purpose of
defeating attempts to gather and administer property on a col-
lective basis; and the potential for discriminatory treatment of
creditors because of their location in different jurisdictions. In
addition to the doctrinal disagreements regarding the admissi-
bility of parallel or concurrent insolvency proceedings for the
same debtor, there are the associated problems of fairness in
coordinating concurrent proceedings, including the application
t Copyright © 1996 Ian F. Fletcher.
* Director, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary & Westfield
College, University of London.
1. In this paper, the abbreviations "EU" and "EC" are employed, together
with the convenient forms of reference to "the Union" and "the Community."
BROOK. J. INTL L.
of the "hotchpot" principle,2 and of rules against double proof
by creditors in relation to what is in essence the same claim.
The authors of the original Treaty of Rome' foresaw the
need to address these problems and thus, they were made the
subject of a special provision in Article 220, which provides:
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into
negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the
benefit of their nationals:
- the protection of persons and the enjoyment and protection
of rights under the same conditions as those accorded by each
State to its own nationals;
- the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribu-
nals and of arbitration awards.4
Non-insolvency matters were resolved separately-and
relatively quickly by EU standards-by the Brussels Conven-
tion of 1968.' In contrast, there has been the protracted and
uneven saga of the "Bankruptcy Project," still tantalisingly
unresolved at the time of this writing.6 The work thus far may
be broadly divided between Phase I (to 1980); and Phase II
(April 1990-November 1995). As a bridging event between
these two phases, we may note the significance of the Council
of Europe Convention on Certain International Aspects of
Bankruptcy (Istanbul Convention).7 This paper will confine
2. See IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 713 (2d ed. 1996); see also
infra text accompanying note 113.
3. TREATY ESTABLISmNG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMIMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I). This treaty, also
known as the Treaty of Rome, entered into force on January 1, 1958 and is still
in force, though much amended, as part of the complex series of treaties which
currently link 15 European states as members of the EU. See TREATY ESTABLISH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; see also TREATY ON EUROPEAN UN-
ION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992).
4. EC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 220.
5. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32. For the consolidated,
current text incorporating the amendments made in 1978 and 1982, see 1990 O.J.
(C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
6. The position stated in the text is as at April 30, 1997.
7. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy,
June 5, 1990, Europ. T.S. No. 136 [hereinafter Istanbul Convention]. The text of
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itself to a discussion of the text which finally emerged as the
culmination of Phase II of the EU project, and which is now
poised to become the concluded EU Insolvency Convention (the
Convention), possibly at some time during 1997.'
II. NATURE, SCOPE, AND IMPACT OF THE INSOLVENCY
CONVENTION AS CONCLUDED BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE FIFTEEN STATES THAT ARE CURRENTLY MEMBERS OF THE
EU, MEETING WITHIN THE COUNCIL
A. Subject Matter
The Convention operates as a mechanism for controlling
questions of jurisdiction to' open insolvency proceedings.' It
also regulates, by means of uniform rules for choice of law, the
law applicable to such proceedings and to matters affected by a
party's insolvency (i.e., third parties' rights in rem; set-off;
reservation of title; contracts relating to immovable property;
payment systems and financial markets; contracts of employ-
ment; registrable rights in immovable property, ships or air-
craft; patents and trademarks; the validity of transactions pre-
and post-commencement of insolvency proceedings that have
detrimental consequences for the general body of creditors; and
the Istanbul Convention, which is not yet in force, is reprinted (in English only) in
12 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS (THE ABERYSTWYTH IN-
SOLVENCY PAPERS) 297-313 (Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1990) (obtainable from the British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London).
8. There is currently no officially published version issued by the EU itself of
the final text of the EU Insolvency Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, al-
though an authentic version in English of the text as opened for signature is in
circulation and has been put in the public domain. See European Union Conven-
tion on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1223 [hereinafter EU
Insolvency Convention]. The full text of the Convention is set forth in an appendix
to the article in this issue by Nick Segal, at p. 75. The text is also contained in a
Consultative Document published in February 1996 by the Insolvency Service of
the Department of Trade and Industry (U.K.) [hereinafter Consultative Document]
(on file with author). This Consultative Document also contains, in Annex B, the
original version of the Explanatory Report on the Convention, drafted in far from
perfect English. For a greatly improved, revised version of the Explanatory Report,
see MIGUEL VIRGOS & ETIENNE SCHMIT, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON INSOL-
VENCY PROCEEDINGS, EU Council Doc. 6500/96, DRS 8 (CFC) (May 3, 1996) [here-
inafter EXPLANATORY REPORT] (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International
Law). This document is likely to be published in due course in the EU Official
Journal.
9. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, preamble, para. 3, 35 I.L.M.
at 1225.
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the effects of insolvency proceedings on pending lawsuits that
involve rights or assets of the debtor).'" All these matters are
the subject of provisions in Chapter I." The Convention next
addresses the recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in
any Contracting State whose courts have jurisdiction pursuant
to article 3. The issue of recognition includes vital questions
regarding its effects, as well as the powers of the office-hold-
er12 and the formalities required to establish the liquidator's
status for the purpose of acting abroad." These matters fall
within Chapter II.' Next, provisions in Chapter III concern
opening secondary insolvency proceedings at the behest of vari-
ous interested parties. 5 Chapter IV contains useful, if limit-
ed, provisions concerning the right of all creditors to receive
information from the liquidator, and to lodge claims in the
insolvency proceedings. s Further, Chapter V delineates an
important provision that confers jurisdiction on the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) to issue interpretations of the Conven-
tion at the request of national courts. 7 Finally, Chapter VI
concludes the convention with a series of important provisions
dealing with ratification, entry into force, revision, duration,
and accession. 8 Chapter VI also regulates this Convention's
relationship to other conventions entered into by any Contract-
ing State. 9
B. Principal Features
This Convention follows the precedent set by the Brussels
Convention 0 in that it is designed as a "double" or "direct"
convention, generating mandatory rules of jurisdiction for all
10. See id. arts. 1-15, 35 I.L.M. at 1225-29.
11. See id. The choice of law .rules of the Convention are discussed in the
separate paper contributed by Nick Segal. See Nick Segal, The Choice of Law
Provisions in the European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 23 BROOK.
J. INTL L. 57 (1997).
12. Referred to throughout the Convention as the "liquidator."
13. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, arts. 16-26, 35 I.L.M. at
1229-31.
14. See id.
15. See id. arts. 27-38, 35 LL.M. at 1231-33.
16. See id. arts. 39-42, 35 I.L.M. at 1234.
17. See id. arts. 43-46, 35 I.L.M. at 1234-36.
18. See id. arts. 47-55, 35 I.L.M. at 1236-38.
19. See id. art. 48, 35 I.L.M. at 1236-37.
20. Brussels Convention, supra note 5.
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cases falling within its scope. This is in stark contrast to the
Istanbul Convention, which is the more familiar type of "indi-
rect" convention, containing rules of recognition and enforce-
ment without imposing a mandatory set of jurisdictional
rules.2
The types of proceedings covered and the categories of
debtor to which the Convention applies are specified in article
1, which provides that it shall apply to "collective insolvency
proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a
debtor and the appointment of a liquidator."2
However, an important series of excepted cases is created
by article 1(2), which states that the convention shall not apply
to "insolvency proceedings concerning insurance undertakings,
credit institutions, investment undertakings which provide
services involving the holding of funds or securities for third
parties, or to collective investment undertakings."" These ex-
clusions relating to entities operating within the financial ser-
vices sector come as a result of separate EU initiatives, cur-
rently in progress, to introduce harmonisation in the financial
services sector by means of certain directives.' These direc-
tives will include standardised provisions governing the insol-
vency of such enterprises.
Article 2 of the Convention contains eight paragraphs,
lettered (a) to (h), which supply the definitions of key concepts
and terms.25 The list is by no means exhaustive, however, and
it is certain that many crucial matters will require judicial
interpretation with the guidance, ultimately, of thd ECJ. In
particular, paragraph (a) states that "insolvency proceedings"
means the collective proceedings referred to in article 1(1), as
listed in Annex A to the convention. 6 For each country des-
tined to become a party to the Convention, Annex A provides a
list of the proceedings found in the law of that country and
which are considered to fall within the letter and spirit of
21. See generally Istanbul Convention, supra note 7.
22. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(1), 35 I.L.M. at 1225.
23. Id. art. 1(2).
24. See EU/Financial Services: Parliament and Council Directive on Investor-
Compensation, Reuter Textline, Feb. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
Ecnews File.
25. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(a)-(h), 35 I.L.M. at 1225-
26.
26. Id. art. 2(a), 35 I.L.M. at 1225.
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article 1(1), thus qualifying for inclusion in the Convention's
operational ambit." The proceedings are listed in the lan-
guage of the country to whose law they pertain. For the United
Kingdom, for example, Annex A lists winding-up by the court
(compulsory winding-up); bankruptcy/sequestration; adminis-
tration of estates of deceased insolvents; creditors' voluntary
winding-up (with confirmation by the court); administration;
and voluntary arrangements under the Insolvency Act 1986 or
the Insolvent Partnerships Order 1994.28 It is notable that all
these procedures involve a role for the court either in the inau-
guration of proceedings or, at least, in their confirmation at an
early stage. The inclusion of creditors' voluntary liquidations,
which in practice are the most frequently used type of liquida-
tion procedure for insolvent companies, was made possible only
through the inclusion of a proviso that there be confirmation
by the court. Such a step is nowhere required under the exist-
ing legislation of the United Kingdom, but could be quite readi-
ly accomplished under the widely framed, permissive terms of
section 112 of the Insolvency Act 1986. These terms enable the
voluntary liquidator to apply to the court to determine any
question arising in the winding-up of a company, and empower
the court to make "such... order on the application as it
thinks just."9 It would seem that a "confirmation order"
might be sought under this provision whenever it transpires
that the case may necessitate action of some kind under the
Convention. If the case is purely domestic in nature, no such
steps need be taken.
The repeated references in articles 1 and 2 to the "collec-
tive" nature of the proceedings under the Convention suggest
one powerful reason that the procedure known as administra-
tive receivership (formerly known as "floating charge receiver-
ship")"0 has been omitted from the Annex A list of proceedings
relating to the United Kingdom and to Ireland."' Although the
procedure plays an important role in the practical operation of
the insolvency laws of both the United Kingdom and Ireland,
27. Id. Annex A, 35 I.L.M. at 1240.42.
28. See id. Annex A, 35 I.L.M. at 1242.
29. Insolvency Act, 1986, ch. 45, § 112 (Eng.).
30. See FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 26 n.21.
31. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, Annex A, 35 I.L.M. at 1241
(Ireland), 1242 (United Kingdom).
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the procedure is essentially a remedy designed to advance the
interests of one particular type of secured creditor, with whom
resides the sole initiative as to its use. Hence, it cannot readily
be reconciled with the concept of "collectivity" that infuses the
Convention. A further aspect of administrative receivership is
that it commences through a direct act of appointment by the
creditor without recourse to a court. Thus, because the Conven-
tion does not provide to administrative receivers the same
recognition and assistance that it does to office-holders in other
types of insolvency proceedings, one may wish to choose a
procedure other than administrative receivership when con-
sidering the best way to rescue an ailing U.K or Irish compa-
ny with significant assets and interests in other EU countries.
Although receivership can, in appropriate circumstances and in
the right hands, be a very swift and effective vehicle for
achieving a business rescue, a receiver can encounter severe
difficulties in a case where it is necessary to enlist the coopera-
tion of foreign courts. Therefore, it may prove to be tactically
advantageous to opt for one of the forms of rescue procedure,
such as an administration order or a voluntary arrangement,
that attract the automatic benefits imparted by the convention.
A further important technical term is defined by article
2(c), which states that "winding-up proceedings" means insol-
vency proceedings that involve realisation of the debtor's as-
sets, including proceedings that have been closed by a composi-
tion or other measure terminating the insolvency, or by reason
of insufficiency of the assets.32 Proceedings which come within
this definition are listed in Annex B."3 For the United King-
dom, the proceedings are winding-up by the court (compulsory
winding-up); bankruptcy/sequestration; and administration of
estates of deceased insolvents.34 This is a far shorter list than
the one appearing in Annex A and inevitably means that a far
more restricted range of options is available wherever the
Convention requires that proceedings shall be "winding-up
proceedings," as in the case of articles 3(3), 16(2), and 27 relat-
ing to the opening of secondary bankruptcies." However, arti-
cle 54 enables the Annexes to be amended at any time on the
32. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(c), 35 I.L.M. at 1225.
33. Id. Annex B, 35 I.L.M. at 1242-43.
34. See id.
35. Id. arts. 3(3), 16(2), 27, 35 I.L.M. at 1226, 1229, 1231; see infra Part VII.
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initiative of any of the Contracting States by means of a cir-
cular notification of the proposed amendment." If none of the
other states objects within three months, the amendment is
adopted." Potentially therefore, the concept of "winding-up
proceedings" could become broader in the future.
III. TIMETABLE FOR ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION
A. Preconditions to Entry into Force
The first precondition for entry into force is that the Con-
vention must be signed and ratified by all fifteen Member
States of the European Union.38 As a convention under the
Treaty of Rome, there must be unanimity among the current
membership at the time of adoption of the Convention." Fur-
ther, article 49(3) expressly provides that the Convention shall
not enter into force until it has been ratified, accepted, or ap-
proved by all the member states of the European Union as
constituted on the date on which it is closed for signature. 0
States which join the EU at a later date are committed to
negotiating terms of accession to the Convention, but in the
meantime it will remain in force among the members of the
EU as previously constituted.4'
Signature is a first step, which by May 1996 had already
been taken by fourteen of the fifteen member states." The
United Kingdom is the only member state not to have commit-
ted its signature, having previously reserved its final decision
until the text of the Explanatory Report had been thoroughly
studied.43 The final date for signature permitted under the
timetable imposed in November 1995, when the Convention
was opened for signature, was May 23, 1996." This coincided
with the beginning of the U.K. policy of non-cooperation in EU
affairs, pending resolution of the "beef crisis" triggered by the
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy epidemic." It is now un-
36. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 54, 35 I.L.M. at 1238.
37. See id.
38. See id. art. 49(3), 35 I.L.M. at 1237.
39. EC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 220.
40. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 49(3), 35 I.L.M. at 1237.
41. See id. art. 49(2).
42. See id. at 1239-40.
43. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8.
44. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 49(2), 35 I.L.M. at 1237.
45. See Peter Riddell, An Escapologist Out of Luck, TIMES (London), June 24,
[Vol. XXII:I
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certain whether the timetable can be reinstated, with a new
deadline for completion of signatures by all fifteen States, in
the near future. It would be open to the fifteen states to revive
the convention by unanimous agreement, and to put in place a
new timetable for acceptance. Less satisfactory would be a
resolution among the fourteen states that have signed up to go
ahead without U.K participation. But this would deprive the
Convention of its status as an article 220 instrument, and the
ECJ could not be involved in its interpretation. The text of the
Convention is considered to be finalised when it is initialled by
all fifteen party states. There is, in theory, some scope for
adjustment of the final text of the Explanatory Report, if such
adjustment could secure final acceptance by the full comple-
ment of fifteen.
Following signature, each state must complete the appro-
priate internal processes, according to its own constitutional
requirements, to enable ratification to take place. In the case
of the United Kingdom, ratification would entail an Act of
Parliament, as with the Brussels Convention46 and the Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations
(Rome Convention).4' The ratification process could occupy
several years, pending completion by all fifteen states. Realisti-
cally, therefore, the entry into force of the EU Convention
could be some years away. Nevertheless, it must now be ac-
cepted that there is a real likelihood that the Convention will
enter into force. Consequently all who may be potentially af-
fected by the Convention's operation should take into account
the possible impact of its provisions. For example, transactions
involving entities which might, should an insolvency occur,
come within the framework of the Convention.
The U.I. Insolvency Service published a Consultative
Document in February 1996, seeking views on the Convention
in its concluded form and on the then-current draft of the Ex-
planatory Report.4" On 26 March 1996, the House of Lords
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
46. Brussels Convention, supra note 5; see Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments
Act, 1982, ch. 27 (U.K.) (implementing the Brussels Convention).
47. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19,
1980, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1492 (1980) [hereinafter Rome
Convention]; see Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990, ch. 36 (U.K.) (implementing
the Rome Convention).
48. See Consultative Document, supra note 8.
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Select Committee on the European Communities published its
Seventh Report for Session 1995-96,"9 drawing on the infor-
mation it had received in February. In paragraph 40 of the
Report, the Committee stated:
The Committee was more than surprised to learn that the
text of the Report might not be finalised before the expiry of
the six month period permitted for Member States' signature
of the Convention. The Committee believes that the opportu-
nity should be taken to improve the Report. Every effort
should therefore be made by the current Presidency and the
Commission to settle the text of the Explanatory Report as
soon as possible .... The Committee believes that all States
are entitled to know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, to
what it is they are being asked to sign their names.... The
Government should not sign the Convention in advance of
their being satisfied, following consultation and consider-
ation, that technical uncertainties have been removed."
As it turned out, the Committee's wish in this respect was
fulfilled since, as explained above, the United Kingdom failed
to meet the May 23 deadline for appending its signature. Thus,
the revised version of the Explanatory Report5' has become
available for study although this version may not be final. It
should be noted that the revised version is, in many respects,
considerably more detailed and precise than the explanatory
reports that have accompanied the Brussels" and Rome 3
Conventions accepted by all the EU member states, including
the United Kingdom. In principle, therefore, one might expect
the United Kingdom to atone for its failure to sign the Insol-
vency Convention as soon as domestic political circumstances,
together with an amelioration in the state of relations with its
Union partners, enable this to take place.
49. Seventh Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European
Communities, Mar. 26, 1996 (H.L. Paper 59, HMSO) (on file with author).
50. Id. para. 40.
51. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8.
52. P. JENARD, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMIERCIAL MATTERS, 1979 O.J. (C 59)
1; see also MARTINO DE ALMEIDA CRUZ ET AL., REPORT ON THE CONVENTION, 1990
O.J. (C 189) 35.
53. MARIO GIULIANO & PAUL LAGARDE, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE
LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1.
[Vol. XMII:
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B. Time of Entry into Force
Article 49(3) provides that the Convention shall enter into
force on the first day of the sixth month following the deposit
of the ratification instrument by the last signatory state to
ratify.' Article 47 declares that the Convention shall apply
only to insolvency proceedings opened after its entry into
force. 5 It further states that "[a]cts done by a debtor before
the entry into force of this Convention shall continue to be gov-
erned by the law which was applicable to them at the time
they were done.""6 There is a potential for confusion and un-
certainty here regarding which previous events qualify as "acts
done by the debtor." The Explanatory Report goes some way
towards determining valid issues in transitional cases by stat-
ing that "the determination of the acts done by the debtor and
the time at which they are done are governed by the applicable
law."57 The basic intention behind the rule is to ensure that
relations to which the debtor is party remain subject to the law
which governed the debtor's acts at the time of acting.58
IV. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
The essential aim of the Convention is to establish a hier-
archical scheme of primary and subsidiary jurisdictional com-
petence in relation to a debtor who meets the specific, qualify-
ing criterion, namely, that the centre of the debtor's main inter-
ests is situated within the territory of a Contracting State.59
In the case of such a debtor, the opening of insolvency proceed-
ings is precluded, save in those Contracting States on whose
courts the Convention confers jurisdiction. This will be true
regardless of whether the debtor might elsewhere fulfil any
locally evolved rules for taking jurisdiction.
From a United States standpoint, however, it should be
noted that there is no attempt to regulate or interfere with the
taking of jurisdiction under national laws in respect of any
54. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 49(3), 35 I.L.M. at 1237.
55. Id. art. 47, 35 I.L.M. at 1236.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 306.
58. See id. paras. 303-05.
59. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 3(2), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
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debtor whose centre of main interests lies outside the EU.60
Established grounds for exercising jurisdiction, such as a "do-
ing of business" or a "presence of assets" test, can therefore be
used in any EU state where the prescribed test for "minimum
contacts" happens to be met. However, the Convention contains
the important proviso that such proceedings will not qualify for
recognition or enforcement in other member states by virtue of
the Convention,6' although they may be recognised on a case-
by-case basis according to the rules of private international law
of each state separately. It is suggested, with respect, that this
is a welcome contrast to the Brussels Convention, which tends
to be hostile toward U.S.-based defendants via its article 4.
Article 4 enables long-arm jurisdiction to be taken against
U.S.-based defendants in one EU state;62 the resulting judg-
ment is automatically enforceable in all the others.'
A. Primary Competence
Article 3(1) provides that the courts of the Contracting
State within the territory of which is situated the centre of the
debtor's main interests shall have jurisdiction to open insolven-
cy proceedings." It is significant that there is no comprehen-
sive definition of "centre of the debtor's main interests"
(COMI), but there is one especially important presumption
supplied by article 3(1) itself: "In the case of a company or
legal person, the place of the registered office shall be pre-
sumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of
proof to the contrary."'
The presumption is thus a rebuttable one, and moreover is
confined to the case where the debtor is a company or legal
60. See id. art. 3(1).
61. Id.
62. Brussels Convention, supra note 5, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (C 189) at 4.
63. See id. For trenchant criticism of this and other xenophobic properties of
the Brussels Convention, see Kurt H. Nadehnann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora
in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 995 (1967); Kurt H. Nadehnann, The Outer World and the Common Market
Experts' Draft of a Convention on Recognition of Judgments, 5 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 409 (1967-1968); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Con.
vention and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1282 (1969); see also IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND EUROPEAN
CoI4Im1UNITY LAW 117-20 (1982). See generally id. ch. 4.
64. See EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 3(1), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
65. Id. (emphasis added). ,
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person. Nevertheless, it offers a useful point of departure for
those wishing to locate the correct forum for commencement of
insolvency proceedings involving a company. Moreover, those
who seek to have the proceedings dismissed for want of juris-
diction must sustain the burden of proving that the company's
COMI is in another country. Significantly, however, the Con-
vention is silent as to the nature of the requisite "proof' that
must be furnished in order to rebut the presumption estab-
lished by article 3(1). The Convention also does not contain any
provision for resolving the possibility of either a "positive"
conflict of jurisdiction between the courts of two Contracting
States, each of which concludes on the evidence before it that
the debtor's COMI lies within its territory, or a "negative"
conflict, where the converse situation arises. An example of the
way in which such conflicts could occur in practice is provided
by the case of Re Bank of Credit & Commerce International
S.A. (No. 10) (BCCI)," where the bank's state of incorporation
was Luxembourg, but the English courts quite reasonably
concluded that its main operational base was in England. 7
One could imagine that, were a similar case to arise under the
Convention, both courts could readily persuade themselves
that the COMI of BCCI was located within their jurisdictions,
for the purposes of article 3(1). In practice, the ultimate out-
come might depend on which court one approaches first, and
on whether that court makes its determination in a manner
that truly reflects the spirit of trust and good faith that is
meant to infuse the working of the EU's conventions.68 In a
difficult case of first impression, a reference seeking the inter-
pretative guidance of the ECJ ought to be made. However, an
urgent situation may necessitate taking some initiatives aimed
at preserving assets and maintaining the value of the insolvent
estate, in the general interest of all affected parties.
B. Subsidiary Competence
Article 3(2) states that where the COMI is situated within
the territory of a Contracting State, the courts of another Con-
66. [1997] 2 W.L.R. 172 (Ch. 1996).
67. This case is further discussed by Nick Segal in his paper. See Segal, su-
pra note 11, at 66-67.
68. See EC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 220.
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tracting State have jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings
only if the debtor possesses an establishment in the territory of
that other Contracting State.69 Here we may note that the
effects of such proceedings are restricted to the local assets of
the debtor.0 Moreover, where insolvency proceedings have
already been opened at the forum of primary competence, any
proceedings opened elsewhere on the basis of an establishment
can only be secondary proceedings7 as defined in Chapter
III.72 Also, territorial proceedings based on the existence of an
establishment can only be opened prior to main insolvency
proceedings under article 3(1) in circumstances where special
preconditions within article 3(4) are met.
The meaning to be ascribed to the term "establishment" is
thus of crucial importance in controlling the exercise of juris-
diction to open territorial proceedings-and especially those
which are to be classed as "secondary proceedings"--with re-
spect to a debtor whose COMI lies in a different Contracting
State. "Establishment" is defined as "any place of operations
where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity
with human means and goods."" The mere presence of assets,
such as a bank account or even immovable property, does not
necessarily enable local, territorial proceedings to be opened.
What is required, in the words of the Explanatory Report, is a
place of operations through which the debtor carries out "eco-
nomic activities... on the market (i.e., externally), whether
the said activities are commercial, industrial or profession-
al."74 The Explanatory Report further comments that "[a]
purely occasional place of operations cannot be classified as 'an
establishment.' A certain stability is required.... The decisive
factor is how the activity appears externally, and not the inten-
tion of the debtor."75 One might observe that the novel con-
cept of "establishment," even with the help of the definition
and explanatory comments provided (or perhaps even, because
of these), will in some cases prove to be elusive and controver-
sial. Like some other troublesome terms, which also carry
69. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 3(2), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
70. See id.
71. See id. art. 3(3).
72. See id. arts. 27-38, 35 I.L.M. at 1231-33.
73. Id. art. 2(h), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
74. EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 71.
75. Id.
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heavy legal significance-"obscenity," for example-we may
instinctively believe we know what is meant, but then encoun-
ter ever-increasing difficulty when having to relate that intu-
itive sense to concrete situations in which a great deal may be
at stake. It seems inescapable that the ECJ will at some
stage-and perhaps at several stages-be required to provide
interpretative guidance on this matter.
V. APPLICABLE LAW
76
The basic principle of the Convention is that "the law
applicable to insolvency proceedings.., shall be that of the
Contracting State within whose territory the proceedings are
opened,"77 the so-called lex fori concursus principle. However,
this principle is expressly stated to be subject to any provision
to the contrary contained within the Convention itself, with
regard to any particular issue.78 A long list of the matters,
which are determined by the law of the State of the opening of
proceedings, is provided in article 4.79 Matters for which the
Convention creates special rules allowing for the determination
of particular issues in accordance with a law other than that of
the state of the opening of proceedings include: (1) "rights in
rem of creditors or third parties in respect of tangible or intan-
gible, movable or immovable assets belonging to the debtor
which are situated within the territory of another Contracting
State at the time of the opening of proceedings;"8" (2) the
right of creditors to claim set-off where this is permitted by the
law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim;8 (3) the rights
of an unpaid seller, exercisable under a reservation of title
where, at the time of the opening of proceedings, the asset in
question is situated within the territory of a Contracting State
other than the state in which the proceedings are opened;
8 2
(4) the rights of a purchaser to complete the acquisition of title,
76. The choice of law rules in the Convention are the special subject of Nick
Segal's paper, and are mentioned here in outline only. See Segal, supra note 11,
at 57.
77. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 4(1), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
78. See id.
79. Id. art. 4(2)(a)-(m), 35 I.L.M. it 1226-27.
80. Id. art. 5(1), 35 I.L.M. at 1227.
81. See id. art. 6(1).
82. See id. art. 7(1).
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despite the opening of insolvency proceedings against the seller
after the asset has been delivered, provided the asset is situat-
ed in a Contracting State other than that of the state of the
opening of proceedings;' (5) the "effects of insolvency proceed-
ings on a contract conferring the right to acquire or make use
of immovable property;"" (6) the effects of insolvency proceed-
ings on the "rights and obligations of the parties to a payment
or settlement system or to a financial market;"85 (7) the "ef-
fects of insolvency proceedings on employment contracts and
relationships;"" (8) the effects on the rights of the debtor in
"immovable property, a ship or an aircraft subject to registra-
tion in a public register;" (9) a legal act detrimental to the
interests of the general body of creditors, and which would be
impeachable under the law of the state of the opening of pro-
ceedings, but which the person who benefited from the act
proves to be subject to the law of a different Contracting State,
whose law does not allow any means of challenging that act in
the relevant case;88 (10) where, by an act concluded after the
opening of insolvency proceedings, the debtor disposes, for
consideration, of (a) an immovable asset; (b) a ship or aircraft
subject to public registration; or (c) registerable securities, the
validity of that act (and thus the extent of the third party's
protection) is governed by the law of the state where the im-
movable asset is situated, or under the authority of which the
register is kept;89 and (11) the effects of insolvency proceed-
ings on a pending lawsuit that involves a debtor's divested
asset or right."
VI. RECOGNITION OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
The basic principle of recognition is supplied by article
16(1), which states that "[a]ny judgment opening insolvency
proceedings handed down by a court of a Contracting State
which has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 shall be recognized
83. See id. art. 7(2), 35 I.L.M. at 1228.
84. Id. art. 8. The law of the situs governs exclusively. See id.
85. Id. art. 9.
86. Id. art. 10.
87. Id. art. 11.
88. See id. art. 13.
89. See id. art. 14, 35 I.L.M. at 1229.
90. See id. art. 15.
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in all other Contracting States from the time that it becomes
effective in the State of the opening of proceedings."9'
Two further, vital principles are established under the
next two articles. Article 17 provides that the judgment open-
ing the main proceedings under article 3(1) "shall, with no
further formalities, produce the same effects in any other Con-
tracting State as under the law of the State of opening of pro-
ceedings, unless the Convention provides otherwise and as long
as no [secondary] proceedings ... are opened in that other
Contracting State."92 Article 18 provides that the liquidator
appointed by a court having jurisdiction under article 3(1)
may exercise all the powers conferred on him by the law of
the State of the opening of proceedings in another Contracting
State, as long as no [secondary] insolvency proceedings have
been opened there nor any preservation measure to the con-
trary has been taken there [pursuant] to a request for the
opening of [secondary] proceedings in that State."
The liquidator may, in particular, "remove the debtor's assets
from the territory of the Contracting State in which they are
situated,"' but in exercising his powers he must comply with
the law of the Contracting State within whose territory he
intends to take action.9 5
A further advantage for the office-holder is conferred by
article 19, which mandates that the liquidator's appointment
"be evidenced by a certified copy of the original decision ap-
pointing him, or any other certificate issued by the court which
has jurisdiction."96 Although a translation into the official lan-
guage of the applicable Contracting State may be necessary, no
further legalisation or other similar formality is required.9
This provision obviates the need for obtaining an exequatur as
a precondition to taking essential action in certain civil law
countries. The provision also has a significant effect upon the
91. Id. art. 16 (emphasis added).
92. Id. art. 17(1) (emphasis added).
93. Id. art. 18(1) (emphasis added).
94. Id. The liquidator's powers in this instance are, however, subject to the
provisions in articles 5 and 7. Id. arts. 5, 7, 35 I.L.M. at 1227; see supra text
accompanying notes 83, 85-86.
95. See id. art. 18(3), 35 I.L.M. at 1230.
96. Id. art. 19.
97. See id.
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liquidator's ability to quickly and effectively handle foreign
assets when they are located in other Contracting States. Fi-
nally, the provision could greatly reduce the costs necessary to
obtain a judicial order of enforcement from a foreign court,
especially where local creditors resist the application.
VII. SECONDARY INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
Chapter III of the Convention enables secondary proceed-
ings to be opened where jurisdiction arises from a debtor's
establishment in the Contracting State." Thus, there is no
need for independent satisfaction of the local law's test for
determining the debtor's insolvency; it is irrelevant that the
debtor's local establishment is trading normally and does not
meet any applicable test that would enable insolvency proceed-
ings to be opened under local insolvency laws.
Secondary proceedings can only be winding-up proceedings
of the types listed in Annex B for each Contracting State 9
This may impede effective implementation of main pro-
ceedings, which are aimed at rescue and rehabilitation rather
than liquidation of the debtor's business. Article 33 enables the
liquidator in the main proceedings to obtain a stay of the sec-
ondary proceedings by application to the court which opened
them. However, it is unclear whether the court has an obliga-
tion to grant the stay. In any event, the order can be obtained
for only three months at a time, although they are renewable
after the three-month period.'
Secondary proceedings can affect only those assets of the
debtor that are situated within the Contracting State where
the secondary proceedings are taking place.' ' Secondary pro-
ceedings are, however, governed by the law of the Contracting
State in which they are opened.' 2 Hence, the primary value
of secondary proceedings is to satisfy local expectations about
entitlement to dividends, to the extent that the locally-situated
assets are sufficient for this purpose. Alternatively, secondary
proceedings can ensure that a locally perfected security inter-
98. Id. arts. 27-38, 35 I.L.M. at 1231-33.
99. See id. art. 3(3), 35 IL.M. at 1226; see also id. art. 2(2), 35 I.L.M. at
1225 (defining "winding-up proceedings").
100. See id. art. 33, 35 LL.M. at 1232.
101. See id. arts. 3(2), 27, 35 IL.M. at 1226, 1231.
102. See id. art. 28.
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est retains full validity and priority as conferred under the
local law. Notably, article 29 permits the opening of secondary
proceedings upon the request of either the liquidator in the
main proceedings or "any other person or authority empowered
to request the opening of insolvency proceedings" under the
law of the state in which their opening is requested. °"
There will be situations in which the situs of assets at a
particular moment in time will be crucial to the outcome of
competing claims arising under rival proceedings, either pri-
mary or secondary, or under the operation of the special
choice-of-law rules. °4 Some definitional rules to determine
the meaning of situs with respect to certain types of assets are
supplied by article 2,105 but many types of intangible, mov-
able property are not covered by these rules. This omission
may give rise to divergent rulings by national courts as to the
approach to be employed in determining the situs of property
whose very "existence" may be dependent on whatever conclu-
sion is reached through the combined application of two po-
tentially variable processes. The first of these processes is the
particular classification method employed; a certain classifica-
tion method may be utilised by the courts of one country in a
way which differs from the approaches followed in other juris-
dictions. The second process is the choice-of-law rules and
methodology that are used for matters of contract. 10 6 Al-
though choice-of-law rules are now supposed to be harmonised
for all EU states through the Rome Convention, 7 the prob-
lems caused by conflicts of classification and methodological
diversity are yet to be fully resolved. The ECJ may be able to
address these issues when it becomes empowered to interpret
the Rome Convention, and it will face similar challenges in its
task of interpreting the Insolvency Convention in due
103. Id. art. 29, 35 I.L.M. at 1232.
104. See id. arts. 4-15, 35 I.L.M. at 1226-28.
105. See id. art. 2(g), 35 I.L.M. at 1226.
106. For examples of the complex problems encountered by courts when trying
to determine the "conceptual situs" of intangible property, see, for example, Callejo
v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic
Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cr. 1976); cf Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers
Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728 (1987) (Eng.).
107. Rome Convention, supra note 47.
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course.' 8 It is to be hoped that a consistency and symmetry
between the two conventions can be established through the
coordinating jurisdiction of the ECJ. There is a heavy onus
upon national courts, however, to play a fully supportive role
through a sensitive and sympathetic approach to cases falling
within their sphere of responsibility. This can best be per-
formed by respecting fully the so-called "principle of Communi-
ty trust" that has evolved as part of the general principles of
EC/EU law.0 9
Other important principles regarding the administration of
assets under the system of primary and secondary proceedings
are established by article 32, and also by article 20. Any credi-
tor "may lodge a claim in the main proceedings and in any
secondary proceedings;""0 liquidators in either main or sec-
ondary proceedings are to lodge in the parallel proceeding
claims which have already been lodged in the initial proceed-
ing."' This reaffirms the principle of collective treatment for
all creditors' claims, but may engender considerable adminis-
trative complexity in cross-accounting and record keeping. The
proposition that no creditor should gain an advantage over
others of coordinate rank, either by means of any private acts
of diligence or through participation in extraterritorial insol-
vency proceedings, is respected and applied by article 20.112
This provision effectively embodies the hotchpot principle,
which mandates that such recoveries must be reported to the
liquidator in any proceedings in which the creditor seeks to
participate; the creditor can begin to share in distributions
only when creditors of the same ranking or category have ob-
tained an equivalent dividend."'
If, by some chance, the liquidation of assets in the second-
ary proceedings results in the full satisfaction of all claims
allowable under those proceedings, any surplus assets remain-
ing are to be transferred to the liquidator in the main proceed-
ings. " In practice, no doubt, the limited pool of assets com-
prising the available estate in the secondary bankruptcy will,
108. See infra Part IX.
109. See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 202.
110. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 32(1), 35 LL.M. at 1232.
111. See id. art. 32(2).
112. Id. art. 20, 35 I.L.M. at 1230.
113. See id. art. 20(2).
114. See id. art. 35, 35 I.L.M. at 1233.
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in many cases, be exhausted when payment has been made to
those creditors whose claims enjoy preferential status accord-
ing to local insolvency law. Where the process of distribution
reaches the level of the non-preferential claims, primary and
secondary liquidators should resolve between themselves how
best to administer the distributional process in the interest of
maximum efficiency. Thus, loss of value might be avoided if
the balance of funds available in the secondary estate were
used to meet claims of local, non-preferential creditors; this
could be accomplished by matching the proportion of dividend
which the primary liquidator pays to creditors of the same
degree whose claims are channelled via the main administra-
tion. Of course, both liquidators must act with vigilance to
ensure that no claim is processed separately in the two admin-
istrations, thus ensuring that no creditor violates the principle
against double recovery.
VIII. CREDITORS' RIGHT TO LODGE CLAIMS
Chapter IV of the Convention contains a limited, but use-
ful, set of provisions aimed at improving the position of credi-
tors in an international insolvency case."5 When creditors
are obliged to participate in foreign-based proceedings, they
can experience disadvantages, either because of explicit provi-
sions of the local law (direct discrimination), or because of
more subtle-even logistical and informational-factors (indi-
rect discrimination). Both kinds of discrimination receive some
corrective attention.
Significantly, article 39 declares: "Any creditor who has his
habitual residence, domicile or registered office in a Contract-
ing State other than the State of the opening of proceedings,
including the tax authorities and social security authorities of
Contracting States, shall have the right to lodge claims in the
insolvency proceedings in writing.""6 In terms of the tradi-
tional principles embodied in the law of the United Kingdom,
this provision overrides the effect of the rule in Government of
India v. Taylor..7 for the benefit of the tax and social security
authorities of other EU member states. The wording of this
115. Id. arts. 39-42, 35 I.L.M. at 1234.
116. Id. art. 39 (emphasis added).
117. [19551 A.C. 491 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
19971
BROOK. J. INTL L.
provision makes it clear that the benefits conferred under the
Convention are reserved for the exclusive advantage of EU-
based creditors. The treatment of creditors from outside the
frontiers of the Union is unregulated, and so is governed by
the laws and practices of the state where the proceedings open.
There are further provisions in articles 40 through 42
whereby the liquidator is under a duty immediately to inform
all known creditors who have their habitual residence, domi-
cile, or registered office in the other Contracting States.118
This must be done as soon as insolvency proceedings are
opened."' The notification is to bear the heading: "Invitation
to lodge a claim. Time limits to be observed."12' This heading
must be printed in all the twelve official languages of the EU,
but the notice itself need be only in the official language of the
state of the opening of proceedings. 2' Conversely, creditors
are permitted to lodge their claims in the official language of
the Contracting State of their habitual residence, domicile, or
registered office; however, they may be required, at the
liquidator's discretion, to provide a translation into an official
language of the state where proceedings open.122
Creditors from other Contracting States can benefit from
the provisions of Chapter IV; creditors' eligibility is based upon
the "functional" factors of habitual residence, domicile or-in
the case of a company-the location of the registered office. 121
It is noteworthy that there is no reference in the provisions of
Chapter IV to the factor of nationality. For the purposes of the
Convention's operation, therefore, it is of no consequence
whether a creditor or a debtor is a national of any of the Con-
tracting States, nor is it relevant to the enjoyment of any
rights or privileges arising thereunder. Equally significant is
the corollary to this, namely, that it is irrelevant, for the pur-
pose of determining standing, to invoke or take benefit from
provisions of the Convention, that the party who does so hap-
pens to be a citizen of a non-member state of the EU. What
matters is simply whether that party currently has the requi-
118. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 40(1), 35 I.L.M. at 1234.
119. See id.
120. Id. art. 42(1).
121. See id.
122. See id. art. 42(2).
123. See id.
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site "functional" connection with one of the member states, by
meeting at least one of the three stated criteria.
IX. INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE
Chapter V gives the ECJ jurisdiction to rule on the inter-
pretation of the Convention, including the annexes thereto.1"
Such rulings may not be requested by courts of first instance
in any of the Contracting States; the right to request a prelimi-
nary ruling is restricted to the supreme courts of the member
states-which for the United Kingdom is the House of Lords
and other courts from which no further appeal is possi-
ble -and also to the courts of Contracting States when act-
ing as appeals courts."6 Moreover, the court making the re-
quest must conclude "that a decision on the question to be
referred is necessary to enable it to give judgment."'27
Since the permissive word "may" is employed in the open-
ing words of article 44, it is always a discretionary matter for
the national court to request a preliminary ruling. Further,
article 45 allows "the competent authority of a Contracting
State" to submit requests for interpretative rulings by the
ECJ."' The purpose of this provision is to enable a uniform
interpretative approach in the future, in case the national
courts give irreconcilable and contradictory interpretations of
the Convention without a reference having been made to the
ECJ in the course of the proceedings.'29 The ECJ ruling does
not affect the actual judgments themselves, but at least the
point may be clarified prospectively, to avoid the establishment
of an unfortunate precedent.'
124. See id. art. 43(1).
125. See id. art. 44(a), 35 I.L.M. at 1235.
126. See id. art. 44(b).
127. Id. art. 40.
128. Id. art. 45(1).
129. See EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 293.
130. See id. paras. 293-97.
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X. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS, FROM THE U.S.
PERSPECTIVE
A. Prospects for Uniform International Approaches
The Convention's basic scheme for allocation of jurisdic-
tion, and for creating an expeditious and virtually automatic
system of recognition and enforcement of insolvency proceed-
ings, is by no means unsatisfactory or threatening for parties
based in non-member states such as the United States. It is
reassuring to note that the Convention imposes restrictions on
the taking of jurisdiction over "foreign" debtors whose COMI is
located elsewhere, but whose contacts and involvement with
the "ineligible" forum may nonetheless be substantial.'' Only
in the case of primary proceedings, opened in the state which
contains the COMI itself, is this coupled with the full panoply
of effects, including union-wide enforceability. It is obvious
that such a tightly-designed set of dirigiste rules as the one
established by this Convention is acceptable and workable only
between participating states whose legal systems and economic
cultures are inextricably intertwined. Only under such circum-
stances is it realistic to envision the prevailing climate of "com-
munity trust" on which the Convention's operation is heavily
reliant. Absent these fundamentals, the potential for manipu-
lation by both creditors and debtors is all too self-evident. It
would thus be wrong in principle, as well as totally impractical
and ineffectual, for the Convention to purport to visit its effects
upon parties and property not directly subject to the jurisdic-
tion of any of the member states. Happily, this principle of self-
denial has been respected.
If it be asked whether the Convention provides a model or
blueprint for adoption by other groupings of states, a word of
caution seems advisable. What is considered to be almost a
matter of necessity for such a closely coordinated and coales-
cent group of sovereign states as those comprising the EU may
well seem totally impractical to states less deeply committed to
the principles of supranational integration. A degree of coor-
dination in matters of cross-border insolvency may perhaps
prove advantageous in a context such as that of the North
American Free Trade Agreement,'32 but this must be ad-
131. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
132. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
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dressed as a quite distinct project upon its own terms. For the
present, there can be no case for the United States to relin-
quish the benefits of the powerful judicial discretion that is
currently available to U.S. courts under section 304 of its
Bankruptcy Code. 3 ' For example, the Bankruptcy Code is
indispensable when a U.S. court is deciding whether to order
turnover of assets to a foreign administrator who may have
gained his appointment under legal processes applicable in the
country where the debtor's "centre of main interests" is said to
be located.
It is perhaps open to debate whether it is useful for the
concept of COMI to be introduced as a specific factor to be
taken into account when a U.S. court is operating under sec-
tion 304. Arguably, it is already open to the court, when as-
sessing the matters listed in section 304(c), to take account of
the strength of the claim to jurisdictional competence on the
part of the foreign court, since this can have a direct bearing
upon those issues. A further possibility which may affect U.S.
courts is that a liquidator appointed by an EU court enjoying
jurisdiction to open secondary proceedings may find it neces-
sary to seek the assistance of the U.S. court. For example,
where an asset that allegedly belongs to the pool claimable for
the secondary proceedings has somehow been removed to the
United States or is the subject of some U.S. action whose con-
tinuation the secondary liquidator seeks to enjoin, assistance
from a U.S. court may be necessary. There would clearly be a
need for the U.S. court to recognise that, according to the
framework of rules under which the foreign administrator has
been appointed, he enjoys a legitimate claim, and one, more-
over, whose validity will be acknowledged right across the EU,
to the assets in respect of which he takes proceedings in the
U.S. court. The concept of "establishment" is therefore one
which the U.S. court will need to confront and evaluate in
relation to cases emanating from the EU.
In the context of considering the above question, it is in-
teresting that the expressions "centre of the debtor's main
interests" and "an establishment of the debtor" seem likely to
be included in the proposed UNCITRAL Model Legislative
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1994).
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Provisions on Cross-Border Insolvency currently being elab-
orated.'34 This should lend added force to the arguments in
favour of promoting uniform international approaches to the
interpretation and application of such phrases, which tend to
be used in an identical fashion in international instruments
which manifestly share a common purpose.
B. Relationship Between Primary and Secondary Proceedings
A further aspect of the basic framework of the Convention
that has transatlantic ramifications is the relationship between
Primary and Secondary Bankruptcies. Understanding the im-
plications of the concurrent proceedings in relation to the same
debtor, running under the insolvency laws of two or more dif-
ferent EU member states, will be of vital importance in such
areas as transactional design and the strategic planning of
commercial relationships with EU-based parties, especially
where these are likely to extend over a considerable period of
time. The U.S.-based party will need to know precisely where
primary insolvency proceedings involving the other party are
capable of being opened. It is also essential to be aware if the
possibility exists for the debtor to be amenable to secondary
proceedings elsewhere, and to know what assets would then be
comprised in those proceedings. Therefore, it may be prudent
to engineer the agreement in such a way that the EU-based
party must make full and proper disclosure of material facts
bearing upon that party's amenability to the insolvency juris-
diction of courts that are subject to the EU Convention. A
further disclosure requirement may be necessary in case the
debtor's modus operandi subsequent to the commencement of
the agreement alters or extends the jurisdictional "catchment"
extant at the time the agreement was concluded. Indeed, lend-
ers may deem it advisable to provide for default if the debtor
does anything that could bring about a change in jurisdiction
134. Draft article 6 of the UNCITRAL provisions details several variants under
consideration as of April 1996. See Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law
on the Work of Its Nineteenth Session, U.N. GAOR Comm'n on Int'l Trade L., 29th
Sess., at 17-20, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/422 (1996). For comments and documentation
relating to this project, see Cross-Border Insolvency Colloquium, 4 INTL INSOLVEN-
CY REV. 1 (1995); Joint Project of UNCITRAL and INSOL International Cross.
Border Insolvencies, 5 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 139 (1996); UNCITRAL/INSOL
Judge's Colloquium, 5 INT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 162 (1996).
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without giving the creditor advance notification and obtaining
authorization from the creditor to proceed.
Similar considerations apply to any act of the debtor that
produces a change in the location of key assets-especially
those affected by real security-where such a change could
materially alter the potential outcome for a party in interest.
The change may be effected by bringing into play any provision
of the convention that could trigger the application of a differ-
ent system of law from the one which may have been reason-
ably anticipated by that party. Even though the Convention
presently seems to be some years away from entering into
force,'35 it is important to note that there will be long-term
agreements whose lifespan could extend into the period when
the Convention will apply to any insolvency proceedings which
open in an EU state. Although article 47 ensures that "acts" of
the debtor done before the Convention enters into force shall
continue to be governed by the law which was originally appli-
cable to them,3 6 it is not easy to calculate the precise extent
of the protection thus afforded to the interests of the other
party. This is particularly so if the act involved an asset whose
situs has subsequently been relocated to another state, and,
under the law of the new state, further "acts" have taken place
in favour of other parties whose claims or security rights might
take precedence according to the law of the new state. 37
C. Choice-of-Law Rules
The choice-of-law rules contained in the various parts of
the Convention 8' are of relevance to U.S.-based parties hav-
ing dealings with a debtor who is subject to the insolvency
135. See supra Part III.
136. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 47.
137. The insolvency proceedings that accompanied the 1991 fall of Robert
Maxwell's multinational publishing empire present plentiful examples of multiple
or successive pledges of the same asset in favour of parties in diverse jurisdic-
tions, resulting in horrendous complexities for the lawyers and accountants to
wrangle over, with an enormous net loss of value to the creditors involved in the
battle. See generally Barry L. Zaretsky, Transnational Bankruptcy, N.Y. L.J., Sept.
19, 1996, at 3; Barbara Franklin, Berlitz's Mystery Shares, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 6, 1992,
at 5; Edward A. Adams, The Maxwell Legacy, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1991, at 5. Such
practices are by no means unique to the Maxwell saga, although the scale of the
misappropriations in that case was somewhat exceptional. See id.
138. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, arts. 4-15, 35 I.L.M. at 1226-29.
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jurisdiction of any EU member state. Given that primary pro-
ceedings opened in any of the Contracting States will enjoy
EU-wide effect, a creditor based in a third state, such as the
United States, must come to terms with the change in advan-
tage which has hitherto tended to favour the agile and well-
advised foreign creditor. Previously, a foreign creditor could
sooner be out of the blocks in the race of diligence with the liq-
uidator, who is seeking to trace and retrieve assets located
abroad. In theory, the Convention will put an end to the phe-
nomenon known as the "bankruptcy haven," and to unprinci-
pled "ring fencing" of assets for the advantage of a privileged
clique of creditors throughout the EU.
To be properly aware of the realities of his or her situa-
tion, a creditor needs to give full consideration to the impact of
the Convention's basic rule whereby the law of the state where
proceedings open governs most matters of substance and all
matters of procedure. Equally vital, however, is an apprecia-
tion of the situations in which the Convention provides for the
application of a system of law different from that of the state
where proceedings open. A creditor must also project the ef-
fects of that law's application to the known or anticipated cir-
cumstances of the case in hand. These situations are covered
most notably by articles 5-15,"' and they include the case
where creditors and third parties enjoy rights in
rem-including any of the various kinds of real security-in
relation to assets of the debtor situated in another Contracting
State at the time of opening proceedings. As has been intimat-
ed above, secured creditors will need to be proactive in devis-
ing suitable strategies to counteract the possibilities that flow
from the rule of deference to the law of the current situs em-
bodied in article 5.14o
From the standpoint of international financial transac-
tions, the provision of the Convention with the greatest poten-
tial significance is article 6, which is concerned with set-
off.' This article provides a special exception to the basic
provision of article 4, which mandates that the law of the state
where proceedings open shall determine the conditions under
139. These articles are outlined supra Part V, and are discussed in detail in
the paper by Nick Segal. See Segal, supra note 11, at 57.
140. EU Insolvency Convention, supra note 8, art. 5, 35 I.L.M. at 1227.
141. Id. art. 6.
[Vol. XXII:
EU CONVENTION OVERVIEW
which set-offs may be invoked.' Where the lex concursus al-
lows for set-off, the article likely will not thwart the reasonable
expectations of the non-insolvent party. However, where the
lex concursus does not allow set-off, article 6 may accommodate
pre-existing expectations founded upon the provisions of a
different system of law. This accommodation, however, is con-
fined to the situation where a right of set-off is conferred under
the law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim (the so-called
"passive claim"). A choice-of-law exercise must thus be carried
out to discover what law that is. Since all EU states are either
currently or prospectively parties to the Rome Convention,'
the result of this exercise should be uniform, regardless of
which member state constitutes the forum of the bankruptcy
proceedings. However, it is important to recognise that if the
law applicable to the insolvent debtor's claim also excludes the
right of set-off, the position of the non-insolvent party cannot
receive a benefit simply because a right of set-off would be
available under the law applicable to the claim in respect of
which that party is in the position of a creditor (the so-called
"active claim").' Given the variations in the EU states' laws
of set-off, it is essential for parties with a large exposure to
loss to monitor carefully the impact of the Rome Convention's
choice-of-law rules as they apply to both sets of contracts with
the debtor. By so doing, a party with a large risk of loss can
assess how much of that exposure could be mitigated through
the operation of set-off.
XI. CONCLUSION
Although the EU Convention may not enter into force for
at least five years, practitioners must now be alerted to the
Convention's possible impact on any client who plans to em-
bark upon a long-term, commercial relationship with an EU-
based party. As soon as there are indications that the EU
states are serious about reviving the project, exponents of the
art of transactional engineering will have to take the
Convention's potential impact fully into account.
142. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
143. See Rome Convention, supra note 47.
144. Further' information about the workings of article 6 of the Convention is
available in EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 8, paras. 107-11.
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It has already been suggested that the Convention's provi-
sions dealing with jurisdiction and recognition are very closely
linked to the "community/union" context in which the
Convention's provisions are destined to operate. This entails
sacrificing much of the discretionary power traditionally en-
joyed by courts in approaching cross-border issues; any propos-
als for the adoption of a similar regime in a non-EU state, such
as the United States, would probably not attract any support.
It is difficult to imagine whether a quid pro quo sufficient to
compensate for the loss of judicial autonomy could be negotiat-
ed.
On the other hand, the choice-of-law provisions in the
Convention, and the key concepts such as "centre of main in-
terests" and "establishment," merit further investigation by
those within the United States who have a serious inter-
est-whether practical or academic-in the evolution of the
subject of cross-border insolvency. Not only will these rules be
of direct relevance to U.S. parties who find themselves em-
broiled in insolvency proceedings opened in an EU member
state, but the rules themselves may be seen as forming part of
the global movement to develop a standardised framework for
processing cross-border insolvency issues. Uniform or "model"
legislative provisions are currently being promoted with con-
siderable vigour, born of a mix of practical necessity and en-
lightened self-interest.'45 To avoid the futility that would re-
sult from the promulgation of multiple sets of incompatible
rules, it is desirable for a coherent synthesis to be attempted
at the earliest possible date, before too many of these projects
become virtually "set in stone."
Finally, let us acknowledge, and acclaim, the operating
limits applicable to the EU Convention. It is deliberately de-
signed not to apply to cases where the debtor's COMI is located
outside the territorial limits of the EU's combined membership.
Nor can its effects reach directly into the territory and legal
systems of non-EU member states so as to affect assets or
parties properly subject to the local laws of those jurisdictions.
Courts and legislators in those states will perforce need to give
heed to the policy and response to be followed in relation to
primary or secondary EU-based proceedings. Given the very
145. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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restrictive terms of the jurisdictional scheme of the Conven-
tion, this should provide a confidence-boosting factor for out-
side courts when invited to assist a foreign representative
appointed by virtue of the Convention's provisions. Thus, in a
case such as Maxwell,146 were it to arise at a future time with
the Convention in force, the opening of administration proceed-
ings in England, the state of incorporation of Maxwell Commu-
nications Corporation plc, would accord with the requirements
of article 3(1). This should be a factor reinforcing the already
demonstrated willingness of U.S. bankruptcy courts to engage
in a collaborative strategy with the English-appointed repre-
sentative, in the interest of preserving value. In no sense
would that appear to undermine the undoubted prerogative of
the U.S. court to exercise its powers according to its own per-
ception of how local parties' interests should be best protected,
and local assets best administered, in a way consistent with
justice and fairness.
146. See supra note 140.
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